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Abstract Although much has been written about the ongoing trade war between China and
the United States from 2017 to early 2019, this literature omits detailed examination of the
substance of the US trade complaints about China. This article seeks to fill that gap in the
literature by unpacking the 20 most prominent complaints that are being levelled by the
Trump Administration. The article finds that half of the complaints involve behaviour that
is contrary to WTO rules and yet the Trump Administration has lodged only three WTO
cases against that behaviour. The Trump Administration justifies this omission on the
ground that WTO dispute settlement is not capable of resolving legal complaints against
China's nonmarket economy and that many of the Chinese measures characterized in this
article as WTO-illegal are actually permitted by the WTO. The article suggests that the real
reason why the Administration chose not to bring multiple new WTO cases against China
is that the Administration prefers to confront China with power-based measures in the form
of unilateral tariffs. Moreover, robust WTO dispute settlement is viewed by the Trump
Administration as unwanted international control over disguised trade protectionism long
favoured by US trade officials.
1

Introduction

United States (US) President Donald J. Trump and his Administration have made China
their top trade target.1 Pronouncing US trade with China to be unfair, Trump Administration
*Prof. Steve Charnovitz, George Washington University, USA. Forthcoming, European Yearbook of
International Economic Law 2019. This article is current as of 19 April 2019 and sources from the internet
were accessed on this date.
1

To be sure, Trump's fixation on China's economic policies is misplaced as the US has greater interests in
securing from China more accommodating policies on regional security and climate change. Cooperation with
China is especially vital on climate change to address classic market and government failures.
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officials in July 2018 began imposing a 25% tariff on $50 billion of imports from China
pursuant to the statutory authority in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.2 The Section
301 authority provides for negotiations with the target country,3 and in December 2018, the
Administration announced a pause in raising tariffs pending new talks with China.4 As of
mid-April 2019, these China-US negotiations are ongoing, but President Trump has
revealed that even if a trade deal with China is achieved, the US tariffs may stay in place
for a "substantial period of time."5
The Trump Administration justified the original Section 301 actions as an attack on four
types of behaviour by the Chinese government: (1) forced technology transfer in China, (2)
involuntary licensing requirements in China, (3) technology acquisitions by China in the
United States, and (4) cyber and intellectual property theft by China in the United States.6
After China retaliated against the first tranche of Section 301 tariffs, the Administration, in
September 2018, imposed 10% tariffs on $200 billion worth of imports from China.7
Besides China, President Trump has hurled criticism at several additional trade targets
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Union (EU).
The competition for pride of place after China has stayed tight, but, as I see it, the
Administration's second biggest trade target is the WTO Appellate Body.8 Trump's Office
of the US Trade Representative (USTR) relentlessly attacks the Appellate Body:
For many years, the WTO Appellate Body repeatedly seized more power for itself – while
undermining and disregarding the very rules under which the dispute system was created.9
The Appellate Body's approach "fails to apply the WTO rules as written and agreed to by the United
States and other WTO Members."10
The "WTO Appellate Body has repeatedly sought to create new obligations not covered in WTO
Agreements."11
[E]fforts by the Appellate Body to create new obligations are not legitimate.12
We will not allow the WTO Appellate Body and dispute settlement system to force the United States
into a straitjacket of obligations to which we never agreed.13

2

19 USC § 2415(a)(1).
19 USC § 2465(a).
4
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 21. Prior to the pause, the
Administration had threatened to raise the tariff levels and to impose tariffs on more imports from China.
5
Davis B, Ballhaus R, Trump says tariffs on Chinese goods will stay on for 'substantial period of time'. Wall
Street Journal, 21 March 2019.
6
USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. See Nos.
1, 6, 18 and 20 below. Navarro P, Trump's tariffs are a defense against China's aggression. Wall Street Journal,
21 June 2018, p. A17.
7
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 20
8
Nixon S, Trump puts the WTO on the ropes. Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2018. The Appellate Body serves
as the WTO's appellate tribunal.
9
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.
10
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.
11
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.
12
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26.
13
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.
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In my view, all of these complaints lack validity. Even worse is USTR's absurd complaint
that "judicial activism" by the Appellate Body is an "important reason for the failure of the
multilateral negotiations" at the WTO.14 USTR also objects to the Appellate Body's longtime rule allowing an appellator hearing an appeal to continue doing so even if her term
expires during the appeal. Abandoning this rule would delay many Appellate Body
proceedings, and so there is no small contradiction in the fact that USTR also objects to
tardy Appellate Body rulings.
The Trump Administration's twin criticisms of China and the Appellate Body feed off each
other. To wit:
The Appellate Body's "activism had the disastrous effect of making it harder for marketbased countries like the United States to push back against unfair trade practices abroad
[...]."15
We will resist efforts by China – or any other country – to hide behind international bureaucracies
in an effort to hinder the ability of the United States to take robust actions, when necessary, in
response to unfair practices abroad.16
China and other WTO Members have put forth proposals that endorse changing the rules of WTO
dispute settlement to accommodate and authorize the very WTO Appellate Body actions that the
United States has protested.17
Instead of constraining market distorting countries like China, the WTO has in some cases given
them an unfair advantage over the United States and other market based economies.18

Although the United States can readily utilize Section 301 tariffs to sanction China, Section
301 cannot be utilized to sanction the Appellate Body. Instead, USTR has sought to put the
WTO appellate court out of business by objecting to the replacement of Appellate Body
members when their judicial terms expire. Currently, four of the seven seats on the
Appellate Body are vacant as a result of the refusal of the US representative to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to join the consensus needed to commence the appointment
process.
Both forms of the Trump Administration's economic aggression are inconsistent with WTO
rules. The Section 301 tariffs against China violate Articles I and II of the WTO's General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The refusal by the United States to appoint new
judges is inconsistent with the procedural requirement in Article 17.2 of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) that "Vacancies shall be filled as they arise."19
These twin USTR assaults undermine prosperity and the rule of law. The reciprocal trade
sanctions between China and the US will reduce economic growth in both economies. The

14

USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.
16
USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 4.
17
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.
18
USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2.
19
Petersmann (2018), p. 187.
15
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US tariff actions are protectionist in practice20 by inhibiting imports in the short run and by
realigning production and supply chains in the long-run (that are a wellspring of China's
economic clout). The disruption of the Appellate Body has hindered the ability of countries
to secure WTO decisions in a timely fashion so to induce other countries to adhere to their
WTO obligations. For the same reasons, these dual assaults can harm the economic interests
of the rest of the world, particularly those countries that regularly use WTO dispute
settlement. On the other hand, the supply chain disruptions can also shift investment and
production from China to third-country beneficiaries.
In parallel to the Trump Administration's trade complaints about China, the Administration
has criticized the Paris climate accord for being an "unfair" agreement that would favour
China over the United States. In announcing that he would withdraw the US from the Paris
Agreement, Trump alleged that the climate accord would allow China to increase its
emissions for 13 years even though the United States could not.21 Back in 2012, Trump had
famously declared that "the concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese
in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive."22
For climate, trade, and many other fields, US unilateralism is not just a means, but rather is
a central part of the Administration's conception of a good world order. As Adam Tooze
has noted, "As far as the American trade hawks are concerned, competition within an agreed
international order is to be welcomed only so long as the competitors agree to play by
America's rules, both economic and geopolitical."23 Likewise USTR: " The United States
will not allow the WTO – or any other multilateral organization – to prevent us from taking
actions that are essential to the economic well-being of the American people."24
2

Overview of US Complaints About China

Although the Trump Administration has not produced a white paper detailing exactly what
it considers China to be doing wrong on trade, one can stitch together a bill of complaint
from various statements by President Trump, the White House, USTR, and other parts of
the Trump Administration.25 China is accused of numerous examples of "unfair" trade
practices and "economic aggression" against the United States.26 Precisely what renders the
named practices "unfair" goes unexplained.

20

USTR denies that the Trump Administration is engaging in protectionism. Lighthizer, at APEC, says
defending U.S. market against unfair trade is not protectionism. World Trade Online, 21 May 2017.
21
White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, 1 June 2017.
22
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en
23
Tooze A, Is this the end of the American century? London Review of Books 41(7), 4 April 2019,
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n07/adam-tooze/is-this-the-end-of-the-american-century
24
USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2.
25
For a US private sector analysis, see Business Roundtable, Recommendations for Chinese reforms to
address
trade
and
investment
barriers,
July
2018,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/archive/letters/BRT%20China%20Priorities.pdf
26
White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018; White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential
Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018; White House, Statement by the
President Regarding Trade with China, 15 June 2018.
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Trump's grievances against China are manifold, but for the purposes of this article can
summarized in the following 20 charges:27
1. The government of China "is forcing United States companies to transfer technology
to Chinese counterparts."28 "Beijing now requires many American businesses to
hand over their trade secrets as the cost of doing business in China."29
2. "Chinese industrial policy" seeks to "capture industries of the future" through
several means such as public investment and export restraints on critical raw
materials.30 "China's unfair industrial policies, like the 'Made in China 2025' policy
initiative, clearly state China's goal of taking away domestic and international
market share from foreigners."31 "Too often, China flouts the rules to achieve
industrial policy objectives."32
3. China imposes "discriminatory non-tariff barriers."33 China protects its home
market with "high tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and other regulatory hurdles."34
4. "China has banned imports of United States agricultural products such as poultry."35
5. China uses "market-distorting forces, including subsidies and state-owned
enterprises" to promote "excess capacity" and "overproduction of steel and
aluminium".36
6. China requires US companies to license intellectual property "at less than economic
value."37
7. "China disregards many of its WTO's transparency obligations [...]."38
8. "China has been a particularly bad actor when it comes to trade remedies."39
9. "China is increasingly attempting to force foreign enterprises to localize valuable
data or information within China [...]."40

27

If the list were going over 20, this study would have included currency manipulation and weak enforcement
of US intellectual property rights.
28
White House, Statement from the President, 17 September 2018.
29
White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration's Policy
Toward China, 4 October 2018.
30
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, pp. 2, 16.
31
White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018.
32
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.
33
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.
34
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.
35
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.
36
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; White
House, Statement of the United States Regarding China Talks, 31 January 2019.
37
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.
38
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 9.
39
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8.
40
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 8.
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10. China imposes "unfair retaliation" against the Trump Administration's Section 301
tariffs.41 China's retaliation against the Trump Administration's Section 232 steel
and aluminium tariffs "appears to be inconsistent with China's [WTO] obligations
[...]."42
11. China continues to follow a "state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and
trade, despite WTO members' expectations – and China's own representations – that
China would transform its economy and pursue the open, market-oriented policies
endorsed by the WTO."43 "WTO membership comes with expectations that an
acceding member not only will strictly adhere to WTO rules, but also will support
open, market-oriented policies," and "China has failed to comply with these
expectations."44
12. China exhibits the largest trade "deficit of any country in the history of our world"45
and the "trade relationship between the United States and China must be much more
equitable."46 "I have great respect and affection for my friend President Xi, but I
have made clear that our trade imbalance is just not acceptable."47
13. "The United States will request that tariffs and taxes between the two countries
[China and US] be reciprocal in nature and value."48 "China imposes much higher
tariffs on United States exports than the United States imposes on China.49 "If they
charge us, we charge them the same thing. That's the way it's got to be."50
14. Projects in China's Belt and Road Initiative "generally ignore market principles and
fail to adhere to internationally accepted best practices in financing, infrastructure
development and government procurement."51
15. China "has already achieved a leading position in many traditional manufacturing
industries" through several methods including "lax and weakly enforced
environmental and health and safety standards."52

41

White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, 5
April 2018.
42
WTO, China – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, Request for Establishment of
a WTO Panel by the United States, WT/DS558/2, 19 October 2018.
43
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 2.
44
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p.3.
45
White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's
Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018.
46
White House, Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China, 18 June 2018.
47
White House, Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
New York, 25 September 2018.
48
White House, Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China's
Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices, 29 May 2018.
49
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018.
50
White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's
Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018.
51
USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 15.
52
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.
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16. China uses a "predatory 'debt trap' model" to "secure and control core global
resources globally."53
17. "China's policies are contributing to a dramatic misallocation of global resources
that leaves everyone – including the Chinese people – poorer than they would be in
a world of more efficient markets." 54
18. "China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition
of, U.S. companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and
generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies."55
19. China uses "corporate governance" law "as a tool to advance China's strategic goals,
rather than simply, as is the custom of international rules, to advance the profitmaximizing goals of the enterprise."56
20. China seeks to "obtain technology from American companies" by "intellectual
property theft" and "cyber theft."57 "Chinese security agencies have masterminded
the wholesale theft of American technology — including cutting edge military
blueprints."58 "China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft
from, the computer networks of U.S. companies to access their sensitive commercial
information and trade secrets."59
3

Detailed Examination of US Complaints

3.1 Analytical Methodology
Part 3 of this article examines the merits of the US complaints about China. Ideally, such
an analysis would begin by analysing the veracity of each charge. Here, for reasons of space,
such a factual examination is beyond the scope of this article. Yet for a few of the charges,
the facts are clear enough to evaluate the validity of the charge.60 For the rest of the charges,
they will be presumed true even though in some instances the Trump Administration has
put forward little or no corroborating evidence.
The Trump Administration's denouncement of China diverges from the usual practice in
contemporary international relations of assuming good faith and expecting a complaining
state to produce evidence for its allegation in an international body or in the court of public
opinion. As the WTO Appellate Body has explained, "it is a generally accepted canon of
evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, in most jurisdictions, that the burden of
53

White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1.
54
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 4.
55
USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.
56
White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 11.
57
White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; Mike
Pompeo, Remarks by Secretary Pompeo on America's Economic Revival at Detroit Economic Club, 18 June
2018.
58
White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration's Policy
Toward China, 4 October 2018.
59
USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.
60
See below Nos. 8 (Trade remedies), 9 (Data localization), 10 (Retaliation), and 12 (Trade deficit).
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proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative
of a particular claim or defence."61
For those charges for which the United States has not lodged a complaint at any
international fact-finding body, the public could reasonably draw the adverse inference that
the claim against China is untrue. That is because if it were true, the Trump Administration
would have been eager to vindicate its claim before an independent fact-finding tribunal.
Positing an adverse inference from non-litigation is especially appropriate in the WTO
context because trade law makes use of adverse inferences.
With the top 20 charges now teed up, the study will proceed by analysing each of them. For
each charge, the study will report on whether such behaviour by China violates WTO law.62
The study will also report on whether such behaviour by China is wrongful. A WTO
violation is inherently wrongful. Yet, the indicated behaviour could also be wrongful – for
example, for moral or economic reasons – even if the behaviour does not violate WTO law.
Next, the study will consider whether WTO negotiations are needed to institute new norms
to correct behaviour that is not WTO-illegal. If the WTO is not the right organization to
craft such norms, the study will consider whether another international organization would
be more suitable. For each charge against China, the study will note and evaluate the
response being taken by the Trump Administration to remedy the problem. Finally, if a
successful strategy is not currently being pursued, the study will point to a better strategy.
3.2 The 20 Charges Individually Examined
1. Forced technology transfer.
A Chinese government measure to force a US company to "hand over" its technology or
trade secrets violates WTO law. Although the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) permits compulsory licensing, a taking of foreign
technology without compensation could violate TRIPS Articles 26, 28, 36, and 39. A taking
of trade secrets could violate TRIPS Article 39.2.
Besides the regular TRIPS rules, China has numerous additional WTO accession
obligations that apply only to China. These applicant WTO-plus obligations are found in
China's Accession Protocol63 and Working Party report.64 Two unique obligations in the
Working Party report (paras. 49, 203) prohibit forced technology transfer.65
The Trump Administration has not lodged a WTO case against China regarding charge No
1. Instead, the Administration maintains that "Many of the worst actions undertaken by
China – such as the numerous informal methods of pressuring U.S. companies to share their
technology with Chinese partners – were not captured by China's obligations at the WTO."66

61

United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS233/AB/R, p. 14 (adopted 23 May 1997).
62
When this article states that a measure by China or the United States violates the WTO, that is a prediction
of what a WTO tribunal would rule should a well pleaded claim be brought to WTO dispute settlement.
63
WTO, Protocol of the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.
64
Charnovitz (2008); Ehring (2014).
65
WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001.
66
USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 7.
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Count me as sceptical that a government can escape liability under WTO law merely by
using informal pressure rather than formal pressure.
In its Section 301 action, USTR contends that "China uses foreign ownership restrictions,
such as joint venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative
review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S.
companies."67 Imposing such requirements, limitations, and processes is subject to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to the extent that it implicates mode 3
commercial presence services. GATS Articles XVI and XVII contain disciplines for China
that are supplemented by additional obligations in China's WTO-plus rulebook.
Notwithstanding these causes of action, the Trump Administration has failed to lodge a
GATS case against China.
In lieu of a legal challenge, the Trump Administration's strategy against forced technology
transfer is to impose Section 301 sanctions.68 By forgoing WTO litigation, which would be
the first-best instrument to secure constructive change in China, the Trump Administration
is left only with inferior instruments. Even worse, because the Section 301 sanction violates
WTO law, the Trump Administration undermines its narrative about China's misbehaviour.
If a US sanction is considered to be politically necessary in US politics, then the sanction
should have been crafted to be consistent with WTO law and to communicate that China's
forced technology transfer is malum in se. In addition, the Administration could have
championed new WTO negotiations to strengthen the rules against forced technology
transfer by making clearer when ostensibly voluntary contracts cross the line into coercion.
2. Chinese industrial policies.
Public investment is often carried out via subsidies. An industrial policy using subsidies
that cause adverse trade effects on other WTO members violates Article 5 of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In my view, WTO antisubsidy law may be weaker in practice than it should be because of some regrettable DSB
holdings that make it harder to show a financial contribution from a public body and to
show a benefit from a subsidy to an enterprise.69 Nevertheless, WTO subsidy law remains
robust. Moreover, in joining the WTO, China took on several stricter obligations regarding
industrial policy subsidies as codified in its Protocol (para. 10.2) and Working Party report
(paras. 167, 171-2).
Using export restraints violates GATT Article XI. China has already lost two WTO cases
(Raw Materials and Rare Earths) regarding WTO-illegal export restraints. Moreover, China
has tougher legal obligations on export restraints than do most (or all) other WTO members.
Thus, depending on the facts, a Chinese industrial policy utilizing subsidies or export
restraints could violate WTO rules. Although disturbingly bereft of any legal analysis, the
US International Trade Commission (USITC) issued a report in December 2017 holding
that China's industrial policies on solar cells "directly contradicted the obligations that

67

USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.
USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.
69
Ding (2014); Rovnov (2019).
68
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China committed to undertake as part of its WTO accession."70 The Trump Administration
was quick to use the USITC report as justification to impose US tariff protection on solar
cells, but the Administration did not pursue the cause of action against China suggested by
the USITC.
Employing an industrial policy is not inherently wrongful.71 Indeed, an industrial policy
that merely invites private investment in a key industry would neither be wrongful nor a
WTO violation. When governments pursue industrial policy, the instrument of subsidy may
be appropriate to provide social benefits, particularly in the presence of a market failure.
Although the SCM Agreement recognizes the potentially constructive role of subsidies,72
there remains an unresolved legal tension between domestic policy space and the SCM
disciplines that regulate such space.73
If governments limited their industrial policies to subsidies, the externalities could be
manageable. Yet a common problem with industrial policy is that governments prefer
cheaper means that use non-spending instruments such as trade measures. The use of import
or export restraints can externalize high net costs on other countries.
The Trump Administration objects to China's pursuit of industrial policies to capture
industries of the future, but from my perspective, such pursuit is a lot smarter than the
Trump Administration's industrial policies to preserve industries of the past. The
Administration's misuse of Section 232 tariffs to increase the capacity utilization of the
domestic steel industry is naked industrial policy. Speaking of the effect of those steel
tariffs, Trump has bragged that "what’s happening with the steel industry is very exciting
to me. It’s being rebuilt overnight."74 The Administration's use of Section 201 tariffs to
protect the washing machine and solar panel industries is another example of backwardlooking industrial policy.75
The Administration's claim that it is "unfair"76 for China to seek to take away domestic and
international market share from the United States is facetious at best. Chinese producers
have every right to compete to expand their market share just as US producers do. US
producers have no vested right to their existing share of the domestic market or a foreign
market. In a market-based economy, producers have to earn their share every day.

70

Supplemental Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission Regarding Unforeseen Developments,
28 December 2017, https://solarbuildermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ITC_Report_Suniva.pdf
71
Charnovitz (1993–94), p. 88.
72
See, for example, Articles 8 (expired), 25.3, 27.13, 27.14, 29.1.
73
Meyer (2018), pp 538–539.
74
White House, Press Conference by President Trump, 27 September 2018. More recently, Trump declared:
"The steel industry is thriving now and it was dead when I came to office." White House, Remarks by President
Trump at Signing of Executive Order, "Strengthening Buy-American Preferences for Infrastructure Projects,"
31 January 2019.
75
The import relief to those industries is questionable under US law which requires a path to "positive
adjustment" and a showing that the relief will "provide greater economic and social benefits than costs." See
19 USC § 2251(a). Furthermore, the absence of US domestic judicial review of such import relief is in tension
with GATT Article X:3(b).
76
White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018.
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USTR has not lodged a WTO case against China for the illegal use of either industrial
subsidies or export restraints.77 This omission is especially puzzling because, as noted
above, USTR argues that "China flouts the rules to achieve industrial policy objectives."78
So far, the Administration has failed to put foward any response to WTO-illegal subsidies
and export restraints by China.
A scheme to utilize Section 301 sanctions against those subsidies would be problematic.
Sanctions will be most effective when focused on one outcome and less effective when
employed as a Swiss army knife79 to seek multiple outcomes. The utility of Section 301
sanctions may also depend on whether the target behaviour is itself wrongful as a violation
of legal or other norms.
Another problem with the utility of Section 301 sanctions against China for subsidies or
export restraints is the fact that China would call attention to the hypocrisy80 of the U.S.
position, since the US government incessantly uses both subsidies and export restraints.
Indeed in 2018, Congress and the Trump Administration worked together to strengthen the
U.S. Department of Commerce's export control programs with the announced policy
purpose of maintaining US leadership in science, technology, engineering and
manufacturing.81
Establishing better disciplines for the use of industrial policy instruments such as subsidies,
export controls, and technical barriers is a matter on which future WTO negotiations should
focus. Yet defining proper versus improper industrial policies is quite difficult. For
example, the Trump Administration's criticisms of the Made in China 2025 initiative82 fail
to take into account the positive externalities from China's green technology subsidies.
3. Discriminatory or unjustified trade barriers.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and regulatory hurdles are neither inherently wrongful nor a
violation of WTO law. Yet, they will be a violation of WTO law if they do not meet the
stringent conditions in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) or the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).
Discriminatory NTBs on products would be a violation of the TBT Agreement if the
discrimination is not based on a legitimate regulatory distinction.
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Oddly, the Trump Administration has not filed any TBT or SPS cases against China, and so
the Administration misses an opportunity to demonstrate unfair and illegal actions by China
affecting US exporters. NTBs do appear to be part of the ongoing US trade talks with China,
and any deal reached will likely contain some ad hoc concessions by China. Yet by failing
to frame the US agenda as seeking to get China to comply with the WTO's regulatory norms,
the United States will likely fail to achieve systemic changes in the way that China writes
its NTBs.
China's high tariffs are neither WTO-illegal nor wrongful per se. Of course, both China and
the United States would be better off if China lowered its tariffs. The best way to secure
that win-win outcome is through market access negotiations at the WTO. Unfortunately,
USTR under the Trump (and Obama) Administration has not championed a successful
conclusion of the WTO Doha Round tariff negotiations.
4. Agricultural import bans.
An import ban on agricultural products violates GATT Article XI:1 and is therefore
wrongful. Back in August 2017, the Trump Administration lodged a WTO case (DS517)
against China regarding tariff-rate quotas on wheat, rice, and corn. The lawsuit alleges that
these quotas violate provisions in GATT and in China's accession agreement.83 In April
2019, the panel found multiple violations of China's accession obligations.
The Trump Administration has failed to lodge a WTO case against any Chinese agricultural
import ban such as a ban on US poultry.
5. Subsidies for added industrial capacity.
The use of non-agricultural subsidies to promote capacity is an illegal SCM actionable
subsidy if the production or export causes adverse effects on trading partners. A subsidy
intended only to raise production distorts markets and is considered wrongful by the trading
system, which prioritizes competing producer interests over consumer interests.
Although the terms "excess capacity" and "overproduction" are intended to be pejorative,
the non-legitimacy of such conditions is contestable. In open, market-oriented economies
driven by supply and demand, excess capacity and overproduction are normal phenomenon
that are corrected by the market. If China produces more steel or aluminium than it will use
domestically, such behaviour is not inherently wrong. For any commodity in an open world
economy, one would expect that some countries would produce more than they need
domestically and other countries would produce less than what they need. The WTO
subsidy rules lay out what is legally improper, but that status does not necessarily match
any economic concept of irrational or anti-competitive behaviour, or behaviour that
externalizes trans-border costs.
If excessive global steel production causes social or employment problems, the most logical
solution would be a multilateral commodity agreement negotiated outside of the WTO. The
WTO recognizes the legitimacy of commodity agreements (in GATT Article XX(h)). In
83
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2016, the G-20 established a Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity. Unfortunately, those
global talks have been held without transparency so cannot be reported on in this study.
The Trump Administration has not lodged any WTO complaints to challenge China's
subsidies that promote excess capacity. For steel, the Administration has responded to
Chinese overcapacity by imposing protective tariffs under Section 232 (of the Trade
Expansion Act) and by imposing numerous countervailing duties tied to injurious subsidies.
Although the US steel tariffs have been effective in raising US capacity utilization, I have
not seen any studies of whether the tariffs have reduced China's steelmaking capacity.
6. Involuntary licensing requirements.
Requiring US companies to license intellectual property at less than economic value is a
WTO violation. To its credit, the Trump Administration has lodged a WTO challenge under
TRIPS Articles 3 and 28. Nevertheless, USTR delayed in obtaining the WTO panel until
late November 2018, over 15 months after Trump triggered a USTR Section 301
investigation and many months after USTR imposed unilateral sanctions.
This US litigation against China has been poorly executed. The cause of action in the current
WTO panel (DS542) is too narrow because USTR neglected to bring licensing claims under
paragraph 256 of the China Working Party Report. If China's licensing practices
discriminate against the United States, then USTR also failed to bring claims under TRIPS
Article 4. If China's licensing practices apply to other countries equally, then USTR missed
an opportunity to recruit similarly affected WTO allies to join a case against China. WTO
cases with multiple complainants typically do well before WTO tribunals.
7. Non-Transparency.
The WTO has two kinds of transparency requirements: domestic and international. The
domestic requirements are for publication and disclosure in China for the benefit of
domestic and foreign persons. The international requirements are for notification to the
WTO for the direct benefit of other WTO Members and the indirect benefit of economic
and social actors.
In 2019, USTR publicly reported its findings regarding "China's extremely poor record of
adhering to transparency obligations as a WTO member."84 So far, however, the
Administration has filed only one WTO case against China regarding transparency, and that
case (DS 517) covers only wheat, grain, rice, and corn. In mid-April 2019, the panel ruled
against China.
This timid US litigation strategy is especially self-defeating since the United States was the
leading proponent during China's accession negotiations for imposing numerous WTO-plus
transparency rules in China's accession agreement that are tougher than the transparency
requirements that apply to other WTO Members.85 The Trump Administration has roundly
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complained about the terms of China's entry into the WTO,86 but the Administration has
failed to take advantage of the many favourable terms for WTO incumbents (like the US)
that provide for numerous WTO causes of action against China. The law of WTO
transparency is already extensive, but certainly new WTO negotiations on transparency
would be useful, including to universalize China's enhanced transparency obligations.
8. Improper trade remedies.
Trade remedies include antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard duties. As noted above,
the Trump Administration complains that "China has been a particularly bad actor when it
comes to trade remedies."87 The record shows that in eight WTO cases, China was found to
have violated trade remedy rules.88 None of those eight cases were brought by the Trump
Administration, and during the Trump Administration, USTR has not lodged any new trade
remedy cases against China. Other than vapidly labelling China a "bad actor," the Trump
Administration has not put forward any strategy to address China's misconduct on trade
remedies. Whether eight trade remedy violations by China renders that country a "bad actor"
is a matter on which reasonable observers could differ.
No reasonable observer could doubt that the United States is a "bad actor" on trade remedies
because the United States has lost an obscene number – currently 49 – WTO trade remedy
cases brought against the US.89 Indeed, the United States is the WTO's most flagrant bad
actor on trade remedies because the United States has lost far more trade remedy cases than
any other WTO member has.90 During the Trump Administration, five new trade remedy
cases against the US have been assigned to WTO panels.91 US Secretary of Commerce
Wilbur Ross accuses China of "highly protectionist behaviour"92 without any sense of
shame that the WTO-illegal trade remedies administered by the Commerce Department also
afford protection.
Ideally, the WTO would carry out negotiations to better discipline improper trade remedies.
Unfortunately, trade remedies have been embedded into the protectionist routines of many
governments, and so this issue is probably too polarized for WTO legal reform to be
achievable.
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9. Data localization.
Data localization, that is, a governmental requirement to store data in the host country, can
be one type of digital protectionism.93 No one disputes that China engages in digital
protectionism. Indeed, the Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index finds China to have by far
the most restrictive policy for digital trade.94
The Trump Administration claims that China forces foreign companies to localize data
within China. Data localization is not necessarily wrongful as there may be legitimate
regulatory justification including privacy and public security. One recent study found that
China's localization measures violate the GATS Agreement.95 So far, however, the Trump
Administration has not lodged any GATS case against China. Other than labelling China a
data localizer, the Trump Administration has not laid out any strategy to address China's
practices on data localization.
The WTO has a role in policing digital protectionism because the WTO can be an arbiter of
when domestic regulation is administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner
(see GATS Article VI:1). Nevertheless, WTO rules may not cover data itself,96 and the
disciplines for the regulation of traded digital services may be narrower than the disciplines
for regulation of products. At the time that GATS rules were written in the early 1990s,
digital protectionism had not yet become an important international concern.
Back in 2001, I advocated WTO negotiations to open up internet market access.97 Little has
been accomplished since then on that problem or the broader problems of digital trade
barriers. The WTO's inability to make progress in the intervening years leads me to wonder
whether the negotiation of such issues should be pursued in more specialised international
fora rather than being reserved for the WTO.
The Trump Administration states that it is "initiating exploratory work on possible future
negotiations" on digital trade.98 So far, however, the Administration's actions on data
localization have been feeble.99 Indeed to date, the Administration failed to propose a set of
comprehensive norms to address digital protectionism.
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10. China's retaliation.
China is retaliating against both of the Trump Administration's unilateral tariffs imposed
under Sections 232 and 301.100 Each of these retaliatory actions violate WTO rules
(especially GATT Arts. I and II) and, for that reason, the retaliation is wrongful. The Trump
Administration has lodged a WTO case against China's Section 232 retaliation (DS 558),
but has not brought a case against the Section 301 retaliation.
China commenced its Section 232 retaliation in April 2018, and at that moment, there was
a good argument that China (and other countries) had the right to retaliate under WTO
safeguard rules against the US steel tariffs that had begun in March 2018.101 After all, the
title of Section 232 is "Safeguarding National Security"102 and Section 232 authorizes tariffs
that are similar to the tariffs that could be employed in a conventional safeguard.
Subsequently, however, the Appellate Body interpreted WTO safeguard law in a narrow
way that had the effect of cutting out the ground under the argument for the legitimacy of
retaliation against Section 232 tariffs.
The threshold question for Section 232 is whether it is a WTO safeguard. The legal case in
support of China's retaliation against Section 232 tariffs was that the US tariffs are disguised
safeguard tariffs for which an affected country can exercise retaliation rights under GATT
Article XIX:3(a). Yet in August 2018, the Appellate Body held that to qualify as a WTO
safeguard, a tariff increase "must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to the
Member's domestic industry caused or threatened by increased imports" of the product.103
Although Section 232 provides a remedy against imports, the terms of Section 232 do not
require either serious injury or increased imports. Because those prerequisites are absent
from the statutory text of Section 232, a WTO panel considering such retaliation case will
find that the Section 232 measures are not a safeguard and therefore that China's retaliation
is illegal.
Given this subsequent development in WTO jurisprudence, China should withdraw its
retaliation. The interposition of subsequent WTO case-law can render illegal a measure that
was consistent with WTO law at the time it was instituted. This clarification in WTO law
gives USTR a right to claim collateral estoppel from a new and unrelated WTO judicial
holding. Ironically, the force of precedent in WTO jurisprudence – a common judicial
practice now being opposed by USTR – will grant the United States a win in the ongoing
Section 232 disputes at the WTO.
China's has also retaliated against the Section 301 tariffs. This retaliation flouts WTO law,
particularly GATT Articles I and II and DSU Article 23. (USTR has not brought a WTO
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case against China for this retaliation.104) China's impulse to hit back is understandable, but
the tariffs are legally wrongful and China should repeal its retaliation. China's retaliation
may also lead to serious environmental consequences from distorting trade.105
The Trump Administration responded to China's retaliation against Section 301 tariffs by
USTR's decision to impose $200 billion in additional Section 301 tariffs on China. This
response shows that China's illegal retaliation was a blunder because it gave the United
States an excuse to quadruple down on Section 301 sanctions. The Trump Administration
sees itself in a winning position because there are much higher imports from China into the
US than from the US into China.
The second tranche of Section 301 tariffs is just as WTO-illegal as the first tranche was. No
unilateral tariffs imposed via Section 301 could ever be legal under WTO rules unless
imposed as a DSB-authorized suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO). To
its credit, China lodged a WTO case against the Section 301 tariffs (DS543), but so far,
China has held off on securing the appointment of a panel. This delay may be politically
connected to the Trump Administration's demand in ongoing US-China bilateral trade talks
for China to agree not to bring future WTO challenges against US unilateral enforcement
of the prospective China-US deal.
11. Lack of market-oriented policies.
The Trump Administration complains that China's economic policies since joining the
WTO have not met the expectations of the United States and other WTO members.
According to USTR, "When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, it voluntarily agreed to
embrace the WTO’s open-market-oriented approach and embed it in its trading system and
institutions."106 Furthermore, "Through China’s commitments and representations, WTO
members understood that China intended to dismantle existing state-led, mercantilist
policies and practices...."107 These complaints raise the fundamental question of what duty
China owes to the WTO regarding China's economic and trade policies.
To analyse this question, one should start with general WTO law. Contrary to the
suggestions of the Trump Administration, the WTO does not require its members to adhere
to any particular economic or political system. Nowhere does the WTO Agreement define
the role of the state in relation to the market or civil society. The WTO rule that may come
the closest to addressing economic systems is SCM Article 29 (Transformation into a
Market Economy), but this provision stops short of requiring a government to effectuate
such a transformation. Nor does the WTO constitution contain a provision to expel a
Member that renounces market-oriented policies.
Although joining the WTO by accession does not in itself entail any special responsibilities
regarding market friendliness, China's accession agreement does cover aspects of its
economic system. For example, China reported that it had the objective of establishing and
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improving the socialist market economy.108 But China's Accession Agreement does not
commit China to adopt "market-oriented" policies and mentions that term only in one
sentence wherein China notes that it is "undertaking market-oriented reform in the
agricultural sector."109 China's Accession Agreement does not contain any commitment by
China to transform its economy or to abandon mercantilism. The Trump Administration is
trying to insinuate rules into China's Accession Agreement that it wishes were there, but are
not.
The issue of how broadly to interpret applicant WTO-plus accession obligations has
occasionally arisen in WTO dispute settlement. In my view, such obligations should be
interpreted narrowly contra proferentem. Under this principle, if a provision in a contract
is ambiguous, then the tribunal should adopt an interpretation that works against the party
who drafted that wording in the contract.
To apply this concept to the WTO, the China Accession Agreement is a contract-like
international agreement between the WTO and China drafted by the WTO and agreed to by
China. Although the applicant China had a role in accession negotiations, the key
documents were drafted by WTO Members (led by the United States) in WTO bodies that
did not include China.
In seeking to join the WTO, China made hundreds of detailed accession commitments. To
quote a contemporary WTO Secretariat posting, "As a result of this negotiation, China has
agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to open and liberalize its regime in
order to better integrate in the world economy and offer a more predictable environment for
trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules."110 In my view, China should
be held to those "important commitments" which is why this article has expressed
disappointment that the Trump Administration has brought only one accession-based
complaint against China. Yet, holding China to its own commitments is quite different from
asserting that China has failed to keep promises that China in fact did not make.
In my view, the Trump and Obama Administration should have lodged more cases against
China based on China's extraordinary accession commitments. For the Administration to
call China a WTO violator without backing up that assertion in a tribunal of law evidences
cowardice if not dishonesty. The best litigation strategy for the US would have been to file
a series of cases under each of the WTO agreements. But if the Administration had also
chosen to push the envelope by filing a broad case against China for its "state-led,
mercantilist approach to the economy and trade,"111 I would have supported that too.
Disciplining large non-market economies is a difficult challenge for the trading system.
Rather than use the WTO, the Obama Administration pursued a flawed geopolitical strategy
to craft better rules in the TPP and then to seek to pressure China into adhering to these
rules. This strategy was flawed for three reasons: First, the rules achieved in the TPP fall
far short of the market economy rules needed to transform the alleged pathologies in China's
economy. Second, the idea of refusing to invite China to join the TPP and then seeking to
isolate China economically was delusional given China's size as the world's largest trader.
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Third, the tactic was naive politically in ignoring China's historic sensitivity to rules being
foisted on it through unequal treaties. A further flaw in Obama's TPP containment strategy
was the failure of his Administration to garner US public support for the TPP project.
Notably, all of the leading presidential candidates to succeed Obama opposed Obama's TPP.
Choosing the extent of market-oriented policies is a matter that WTO subsidiarity leaves to
governments. While governments need not be clones of each other, there is a role for trade
agreements to nudge governments toward best practices in regulation, deregulation, and
privatization. In some areas, tight rules may be useful, but in others, governments should be
able to retain their diversity and policy space. While internationally-agreed norms play an
important role in improving domestic policies, such norms should not seek to displace the
role of competition between countries as a way to get governments to lift standards.
12. High bilateral trade deficit.
President Trump has constantly complained about the high US trade deficit with China. In
2018, the bilateral goods deficit was $419 billion, the highest level ever.112 A bilateral trade
deficit in goods is not wrongful per se and is not WTO-illegal. The US trade deficit with
China may be more interesting than the US deficit with Chad, but that is only because China
is much bigger than Chad, not because the US-China deficit is a meaningful policy target.
Although the Trump Administration complains about state-led mercantilism, nothing can
be more mercantilist than the demands of the Administration for the bilateral trade balance
with China to be "more equitable."113
All things being equal, a higher trade deficit in goods and services wreaks greater negative
impact on domestic import-competing industry than a lower trade deficit does. The most
meaningful bilateral trade numbers cover both goods and services, and in 2018, that goods
and services deficit with China was $379 billion.114 Thus, undertaking structural economic
changes that would lower the $379 billion deficit with China is a good idea.
A US trade deficit with China means that US consumers and producers buy more from
China than Chinese consumers and producers buy from the United States. The least coercive
way to address this imbalance is for the United States to expand US exports of goods and
services to China. By contrast, direct action to reduce US imports from China entails
coercion and infringes freedom.
Many targeted policy reforms to expand US exports have been suggested. For example, the
US government could reduce its gargantuan budget deficit, which has been expanding under
the Trump Administration. A budget deficit pulls in foreign capital that cannot be used to
purchase US exports. The US government could make US exports more competitive by
reducing production costs stemming from underinvestment in infrastructure,
underinvestment in Chinese language training, and overregulation of US companies. The
US government could also eliminate unnecessary US export controls. Trump's new tariffs
on China have had the indirect effect of reducing Chinese demand for high-tech US products
such as iPhones. That provides yet another reason to withdraw the Section 301 tariffs.
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Unfortunately, the Trump Administration is not pursuing any of those constructive remedies
to boost US exports. Instead, the Trump Administration appears to be using two tactics to
lower the US trade deficit with China.
First, the President is asking China for a purchase agreement with monetary import targets
for US goods.115 This request is cynical because the Administration on one side of its mouth
is demanding that the Chinese government exercise greater management of its trade while
on the other side of its mouth, the Administration demands that the Chinese government be
more market-oriented and less statist. The request is also problematic for third parties
because if China commits to importing more from the US, then China may reduce imports
from other WTO member countries. Any quantitative US-China trade agreement may run
afoul of Article 11.1(b) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement which forbids arrangements
involving "export or import surveillance" when such arrangements afford protection. In
addition, should China's government intervene to dictate the origin of goods purchased by
state-invested or state-owned enterprises, that would violate one of China's accession
commitments.116
The second tactic is to impose tariffs on China in order to lower imports from China. That
result has not clearly happened yet, but with a high enough tariff, it would. One thing that
is clear is that most of the Trump Administration's new tariffs against China violate WTO
rules. The Section 301 tariffs violate GATT Articles I and II. The Section 232 tariffs violate
GATT Articles I and II and are not justified under the national security exception in GATT
Article XXI.117 The Section 201 tariffs on washing machines violate GATT Article XIX
because the US government failed to make any determination on "unforeseen
developments.” The US safeguard on solar panels may also violate GATT Article XIX.
China's high trade surplus with the United States should be subject to WTO tariff
negotiations. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has not shown any interest in the
Doha Round or a renamed new trade round. China agreed to lower its tariffs and other
barriers as part of its accession negotiations circa 1999, but 20 years later, China should do
so again. Likewise, over 25 years after the conclusion of Uruguay Round tariff negotiations,
a new round of liberalization by the United States is long overdue.
13. Unharmonized tariffs and taxes.
Trump's call for China and US tariffs and taxes to be mirrored or reciprocal is perhaps his
most perverse recommendation. For the United States to fail to match China's taxes and
tariffs is hardly wrongful. Nor are non-matching taxes and tariffs a violation of WTO rules.
Certainly, the US and China could negotiate tariff and tax bindings within the WTO to seek
fiscal harmonization. What cannot be done is for China and the US to harmonize higher
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tariffs and taxes on each other because that would violate the most-favoured-nation (MFN)
rule.
The idea that the United States would delegate to China the setting of US tax and tariff
levels is fiscally unwise. Allowing China to determine US fiscal policy is also a violation
of US constitutional principles of self-government. This deference to China is a surprising
recommendation for the Trump Administration which has declared that: "Trade policy, like
tax policy, must reflect the wishes, concerns, and priorities of the American people – and
should not be dictated by technocrats who are not responsible to Americans. The United
States remains an independent nation, and our trade policy will be made here – not in
Geneva."118 Made in Washington except when Trump calls for US taxes and tariffs to be
made in Beijing!
The Trump Administration is right in suggesting that China should lower its high tariffs.
This is the sort of goal that could properly be addressed in a new round of WTO
negotiations. Unfortunately, Trump's USTR (and before it Obama's USTR) failed to press
for such negotiations.
If China and the US had a free trade agreement (FTA), then the tariffs of both countries
could be harmonized to zero. The goal of joining China in an FTA has never been suggested
by the Trump Administration. Indeed, in the negotiations for a new trade agreement
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, the Trump Administration insisted on
adding a new provision (Article 32.10) to discourage any North American country from
negotiating an FTA with China.119
14. Belt and Road.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's major international development investment
initiative to expand trade-related foreign infrastructure. BRI is designed not only to expand
China's trade, but also to promote development and connectivity to many countries around
China. Begun only six years ago, BRI is already having a major economic and political
impact. Countries that need to improve their infrastructure are signing on despite
misgivings.120
Since BRI does not directly involve the United States, the carping at BRI by the Trump
Administration can only be the result of envy at the leadership, deep pockets, and
administrative prowess shown by China. No question, the Trump Administration has a lot
to envy because it is failing to achieve any major infrastructure program abroad or at home.
For the Trump Administration, ambitious infrastructure means a wall at the Mexican border
and even that ill-advised project is not being achieved.
USTR's complaint that BRI "fails to adhere to internationally accepted best practices in
infrastructure development and government procurement"121 leads to some questions: Do
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the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 17.1–17.5 cover best practices in
development financing? What are "best practices" in infrastructure development? How
much of the success of BRI is owed to the inadequacy of development financing from
advanced economies? Such questions are important, but cannot be explored here.
However well or poorly China follows best practices in development financing, very little
of that touches on WTO law. Indeed, subsidies to foreign countries are omitted from
coverage in the SCM Agreement. Thus, China's failure to follow best practices in BRI is
not wrongful in world trade law. In my view, the best practice mostly missing from BRI is
that China has not built a sustainable development dimension into BRI and has not laid out
a good plan to conduct environmental impact analysis.122
Two respected international legal scholars, Julien Chaisse and Mituso Matsushita, view BRI
as a way for China "to export its development model.123 Certainly, the broad scope of BRI
turns it into a transnational issue for which China should engage in negotiations with key
governments and international organizations. Based on the scope of BRI, the WTO seems
an inapposite forum for such negotiations.
So far, the Trump Administration has not instituted any trade actions specifically against
BRI. The main response by the Administration to BRI has been to work with the US
Congress to enact a new law to improve US development finance programs.124 The BUILD
Act seeks to reorganize federal agencies with responsibilities for development finance and
to expand US funding.125 The Act takes a step in the right direction of competing with China
rather than coercing it.
15. Lax environmental standards.
The Trump Administration complains that China's lax environmental standards and weak
enforcement of them helps China "dominate traditional manufacturing industries."126 The
theory that lax environmental, health or safety standards can drive national economic
success is controversial, and growing evidence shows that a business can enhance its
competitiveness by improving environmental sustainability.127 For a government to
maintain unjustifiably low environmental standards is wrongful, but such behaviour is not
regulated by the WTO.
The WTO did include fishery subsidies as a Doha Round issue, but that issue was a poor fit
for the WTO. In general, environmental challenges should be addressed in international
environmental fora and fishery challenges should be addressed in international fishery fora.
As the eminent environmentalist Konrad von Moltke pointed out decades ago, an
environmental issue migrates to the trading system only when it is not being successfully
managed within the appropriate international regime.
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Many FTAs contain commitments regarding the enforcement of domestic environmental
standards. For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) directs that "a party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from [...]
its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those
laws in order to encourage trade or investment between the Parties."128 At this time, neither
China nor the United States is a party to the CPTPP.129 To my knowledge, no FTA has
regulated the level of environmental standards (except to incorporate norms in mutually
agreed multilateral environmental agreements).
Whether the environmental, health, and safety standards of China and the United States are
set at the right level is a proper matter of mutual interest especially when standards cover
global issues, such as ocean pollution, air pollution, or waste. Lowering environmental
standards can raise trade concerns, but so can the raising environmental standards. For
example in 2018, China imposed a ban on recycled imports and plans a future ban on
rubbish imports.130 This action directly affects the US economy because China has been a
major destination for US recycling and trash exports.
16. Securing natural resources.
The Trump Administration complains that China uses a predatory debt trap model to secure
natural resources. Depending on the facts as to predation and trapping, this may be wrongful
behaviour. On the other hand, an ungenerous lending practice is not a WTO violation.
Moreover, I am not aware of any pertinent international legal norms that cover such
behaviour other than on tied aid.
Certainly, appropriate sovereign lending terms are a topic ripe for multilateral or regional
negotiations. The World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) could each be an appropriate forum for these
discussions. In my view, the WTO would not be the right forum for those issues other than
when related to trade governance capacity.
17. Global misallocation of resources.
The Trump Administration complains that China is misallocating global resources in a way
that leaves everyone poorer. The proper allocation of resources is a key economic function
typically left to markets. The Preamble to the WTO Agreement suggests that governments,
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in their trade relations, should be "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development [...]."131
Notwithstanding that norm, the WTO has no rules regarding the proper allocation of
resources. Adding such an issue to the WTO's agenda would not be a good idea because the
WTO's agenda is already overloaded. Moreover, the WTO has performed poorly in
negotiating numerous issues much more central to the WTO's mission.
The beauty of markets is that they handle a task like allocating resources through the gainful
and voluntary interaction of private actors. Allocation bureaucrats are not needed. The
Administration's complaint seems to be that allocation decisions in China are too often
being made administratively rather than in the market. Obviously, China could lodge the
same complaint against the US given the numerous non-market allocations being imposed
by the Trump Administration.
The White House contends that a misallocation of resources can leave the Chinese people
poorer than they would be in a world of efficient markets. In defending its economic
aggression against China, USTR argues that "the distortions caused by China's non-market
system" are bad not only for the United States, but for China too.132 I agree with both
contentions and with USTR's similar claim that reforms in China to pursue an "open,
market-oriented approach" will "also benefit China, by placing its economy on a more
sustainable path [...]."133 The Trump Administration's insight is supported by the
enlightened private sector. For example, Jamie Dimon, in his annual letter to JPMorgan
Chase stockholders, recently explained: "We should only expect China to do what is in its
own self-interest, but we believe that it should and will agree to some of the United States’
trade demands because, ultimately, the changes will create a stronger Chinese economy."134
The paradox in this pressure on China to swallow its economic medicine is that given how
competitive135 China now is against the United States with one hand tied behind its back
due to distorted allocations, who knows how much more economically powerful China
would become once it improves its suboptimal economic policies.
The worst misallocation of resources occurring in the world today is the excessive reliance
on energy from fossil fuels. Such behaviour is wrongful in view of what scientists warn
about the effects of carbon energy on climate change. The Trump Administration supports
"promoting more efficient markets,"136 but the world's most egregious market inefficiency
is the failure to internalize the costs of utilizing carbon energy. Neither China nor the US
has appropriate carbon internalization policies.
Instituting carbon charges falls within the wheelhouse of the climate regime. So far, the
Paris Agreement has avoided instituting such policy norms. Even if one considers this
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stance a failure in climate policy (as I do), no one should look to the WTO as a substitute
forum for negotiating climate policies such as carbon charges or border adjustments.
18. China's acquisitions in US.
The Trump Administration complains that China directs and unfairly facilitates investment
and acquisition to generate large-scale technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese
entities. Neither outward foreign investments nor inward foreign investments are
intrinsically wrongful in a global economy. Indeed, the movement of capital and technology
across borders are normal processes that benefit both capital exporting and capital importing
countries.
The WTO is largely silent on the international acquisition of technology, but there is some
soft law favouring openness. One WTO agreement calls on governments to "facilitate
investment across international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading
partners [...]."137 Another WTO agreement suggests that developed countries "should
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed country Members in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base."138
The limited international investment law obligations in the WTO need to be read in
conjunction with the extensive discretion that remains with national regulators to control
inward foreign investment and acquisition of domestic enterprises and technologies. WTO
rules would permit a government to bar inward foreign investment and foreign acquisition
of domestic technology. Barring the importation of capital from one country, but not others,
is subject to being examined pursuant to the non-discrimination rules of GATS Article II.
If the Trump Administration wants to bar Chinese entities from making certain investments
in the US or transferring technology back to China, then the US government would have
prescriptive jurisdiction to enact and enforce national laws to accomplish that objective.
Such laws are reviewable under WTO rules, but the United States has nearly complete
discretion under the WTO to enforce such laws against China. The TRIPS Agreement
regulates the protection of alien intellectual property, but the TRIPS Agreement does not
mandate free trade in domestic intellectual property and technology.
The Trump Administration is imposing Section 301 tariffs to punish China's efforts to invest
in the United States, to acquire US companies that have cutting-edge technologies, and to
transfer such technology back to China.139 As noted above, the use of Section 301 tariffs
violates US obligations in the WTO.
But not only are Section 301 tariffs internationally illegal, they are also grossly inefficient
in targeting China's actions in the US. By far, the most effective instrument for the United
States to use to regulate China's actions within the US territory is domestic regulation. For
a sanctioning addict like the United States to waste sanction-sending resources to achieve a
purpose that can be fully achieved under domestic law is feckless. The same point applies
in No. 20 below.
137

WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Preamble.
TRIPS Article 66.2.
139
USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018.
138

25

26

The particular domestic law that the United States uses to control foreign investments is
notoriously unfair. The regulator is the President and the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (CFIUS) who together can review foreign investments affecting
national security broadly defined. CFIUS is a committee of federal officials without any
public members. In CFIUS proceedings, neither the applicant foreign person nor the
domestic counterparty enjoy any rights. Worse yet, the regulator has untrammelled
discretion. The closed nature of the process makes it difficult for the public to see how
arbitrarily foreign entities are being treated.
Under the Trump Administration, the outrageous CFIUS process has gotten even worse
following a new federal law passed by the Congress in 2018 that denies judicial review of
the President's findings or actions.140 The recent ramping up of US regulation of domestic
enterprises seeking foreign investment violates market principles141 and demonstrates the
need for new international rules to discipline CFIUS-style regulations.142
19. Corporate governance law.
The Trump Administration complains that China uses corporate governance law "as a tool
to advance China's strategic goals, rather than simply, as is the custom of international rules,
to advance the profit-maximizing goals of the enterprise."143 Of the 20 claims reviewed
here, this claim is the most fatuous. As noted above, this article does not attempt to reach
the truth as to what is occurring in China. Thus, I will assume that China is using its
corporate law to advance China's strategic goals. Corporate law, like any law, exists for the
purpose of promoting the public interest.
The Trump Administration claims that there is an international custom or international rule
that enterprises should only advance their profit-maximizing goals. No evidence is put
forward for that claim and I do not know of any. Certainly, the WTO does not have a rule
mandating or suggesting that enterprises should maximize their profits. In the United States,
no federal or state law assigns enterprises the duty of maximizing their profits.
In a recent restatement of the basic principles of corporate law around the world, a group of
experts explained:
Contrary to widespread belief, corporate directors generally are not under a legal obligation to
maximise profits for their shareholders. This is reflected in the acceptance in nearly all jurisdictions
of some version of the business judgment rule, under which disinterested and informed directors have
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the discretion to act in what they believe to be in the long-term interests of the company as a separate
entity, even if it does not entail seeking to maximize short-term shareholder value.144

I do not know what the latest trends are in Chinese corporate governance, but contrary to
the claim of the Trump White House, if China is seeking to steer companies to pursue goals
other than profit maximizing that would not place China out of the comparative mainstream
nor diverge from the US approach. If instead of leaving corporate goals up to each company,
China were to task its corporations to pursue sustainability and decent work and to refrain
from corruption, such corporate law would not appear to impose any harm on the US
economy.
20. Cyber and intellectual property theft.
The Trump Administration complains that China's government engages in "theft" of
American technology. Such theft is illegal under U.S. law. Rather than improving
enforcement of federal law, however, the Trump Administration in July 2018 imposed
Section 301 tariffs on China to counter the thefts. Finally, in an apparent afterthought, the
Administration began stepping up high-profile domestic enforcement actions against
Chinese entities.145
A proposition that either theft and espionage violates WTO law seems doubtful, but I
reserve judgment. No doubt exists that a Section 301 tariff against theft and espionage
violates WTO law. Using the Section 301 instrument is especially paradoxical for a purpose
for which straightforward penalties such as US criminal prosecutions are available. Whether
US criminal law provides sufficient deterrence against perpetrators beyond the reach of US
courts is a matter that should be considered. Some analysts have suggested that indicting
wrongdoers is not sufficient, and that non-tariff sanctions against the responsible Chinese
perpetrators are needed.146
The analysis above of Trump's top 20 gripes about China's trade practices is summarized in
Table 1 below:
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Table 1
Key Aspects of Trump's Top 20 Complaints About China's Behaviour
Complaint

Is behaviour
wrongful?

Does this
behaviour
violate WTO?

Did
Trump
lodge
WTO
case?

Are new WTO
negotiations
necessary?

Are
negotiations
outside the
WTO
necessary?

1. Forced
technology
transfer

Yes

Yes

No

No, but could
be useful

No

2. Chinese
industrial
policies

Depends on the
facts

Yes, depending
on the facts

No

No, but could
be useful

No

3. Non-tariff
barriers and
high tariffs

Yes, if
unjustifiable or
discriminatory

Yes, if
unjustifiable or
discriminatory

No

Yes, for tariffs

No

4. Agricultural
import bans

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

5. Subsidies for
added industrial
capacity

Yes, if no other
policy purpose

Yes

No

No, but could
be useful

No, but could
be useful

6. Involuntary
licensing
requirements

Yes

Yes

Yes

No, but could
be useful

No

7. Disregard of
transparency
obligations

Yes

Yes

Yes

No, but could
be useful

No, but could
be useful

8. Improper
trade remedies

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No
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9. Data
localization

Yes, depending
on the facts

Yes, depending
on the facts

No

Yes

Yes

10. China's
tariff retaliation

Yes

Yes

Yes for
§232

No

No

No for
§301

11. Lack of
market-oriented
policies

No

Maybe
depending on
future legal
interpretation

No

Yes

Yes, in some
regimes

12. High
bilateral trade
deficit

No, but it is not
optimal

No

No

Yes

No

13.
Unharmonized
tariffs and taxes

No

No

No

No, not for
harmonization
in itself

No

14. Belt and
Road

No

No

No

No

Yes, in some
regimes

15.
Unjustifiably
lax
environmental
standards

Yes

No

No

No

Yes, in
environmental
regimes

16. Securing
natural
resources

Depends on the
facts

No

No

No

Yes

17. Global
misallocation of
resources

Yes

No

No

No

Yes, in the
climate regime
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18. China's
acquisitions in
US

Not in general

No

No

No

This issue
amenable to
national law,
but more
international
cooperation
could be useful

19. Corporate
governance law

No

No

No

No

No

20. Cyber and
intellectual
property theft

Yes

Not generally

No

No

This problem
amenable to
national law,
but more
international
cooperation
would be useful

3.3 Overall Findings
One of the most dangerous trade fallacies propounded by the Trump Administration is that
its aggressive trade actions against China will "ensure that the costs of China's non-market
economic system are borne by China, and not by the United States."147 Nothing can be
further from reality. U.S. tariffs are paid by importers within the United States with the costs
ultimately borne by either US domestic purchasers of imports or foreign exporters. A recent
empirical study suggests that in this current episode, the costs are being borne by US
consumers rather than Chinese exporters.148 While China may suffer some lost sales to the
United States, the US economy definitely suffers harm. One analyst has recently predicted
that "because China exports to Americans dwarf our exports to them, trade restrictions can
inflict disproportionate harm to China's economy."149 This argument errs by looking only
at the export side of the trade transaction and not looking at the harm caused by US tariffs
to Americans.
Besides being a double-edged weapon, US tariffs obscure the normative message that the
United States should be communicating about China's misbehaviour. Instead, the US tariffs
themselves become the message and China focuses its attention to how to defend itself from
the assault by retaliating against the sender country and by shifting exports to third
countries. In the US public arena, the processes to choose US tariff targets and award
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exemptions to lawyered-up importers absorb most of the media's attention. This cybernetic
failure renders the tariffs an incoherent and defective strategy for transforming China.
As the Trump Administration will learn, the ad hoc nature of the Section 301 sanctions will
make them difficult to remove in a negotiation with China. Because the sanctions are
normless, a perfectionist-protectionist coalition is sure to rise up to fight against tariff
removal. Both groups in the coalition will argue that the Administration should not be a
patsy to empty promises by China.
The Trump Administration's most serious normative failure is to engage China through
power rather than law. The narrative is oddly disjunctive. The Trump's Administrations
anti-China rhetoric often sounds in law. For example, USTR explained that "Unfortunately,
China has a poor record when it comes to complying with WTO rules and observing the
fundamental principles on which the WTO agreements are based."150 The White House
declared that Trump "is following through on his pledge to take action to ensure that China
finally plays by the rules."151 Trump himself has referred to China's "illicit trade practices"
and to its "misconduct."152 Given these assertions, the Administration's multiple failures to
bring legal complaints is a non-sequitur.
The Administration has been remarkably candid as to why it has not invoked WTO dispute
settlement:
China has no fear of WTO dispute settlement, even as it continues to embrace a state-led mercantilist
approach to the economy and trade [...].153
No matter how many cases are brought at the WTO, China can always find a way to engage in
market-distorting practices.154
Any suggestion that the United States or other WTO members could address the numerous problems
outlined in this [USTR] report solely by relying on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is naïve
in theory, and likely to prove downright harmful in practice.155
While the WTO dispute settlement process is of only limited value in dealing with China's non-market
practices, the Chinese government is eager to draw upon the judicial activists at the WTO to protect
its economic system.156

USTR provides no evidence to back up these claims and I am not aware of any. Whether or
not China fears WTO dispute settlement, the government of China's failure to comply after
losing a WTO case would seem to be no worse than the US government's failure to comply.
Instead, the Administration's true concern may be that continued compliance by China will
put the spotlight on persistent non-compliance by the United States, especially on trade
remedy violations. For the Trump Administration, WTO dispute settlement is a problem not
a solution. That is why zeroing out the WTO Appellate Body is a higher priority for USTR
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than lodging cases against China. Moreover, if there will not be an Appellate Body after
2019, why bother bringing new legal cases against China?
By failing to make legal arguments against China, the Trump Administration dilutes
whatever normativity may exist for persuading the world of its claim that China is not
playing by the rules. Many WTO experts agree that the Administration has missed an
opportunity to file WTO cases against China.157 In the current trade war against China, the
most notorious rule-breaker is the United States which is ignoring its DSU Article 23
obligation to use the WTO dispute system rather than Section 301 and is ignoring its
obligation not to impose unilateral tariffs on China.
The Trump Administration's myopia regarding the benefits of challenging China's actions
as a violation of WTO rules is strangely shared others who are quick to point out what China
is doing wrong. The most maddening advocacy comes from the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, an advisory group established by Congress in 2000. In its
most recent report (the 2018 report which is its 16th annual report) the taxpayer-funded
Commission floats the idea that USTR should bring a "non-violation" case against China at
the WTO.158 Besides missing the key point that China is violating the WTO, a non-violation
case is difficult to win and hardly worth the effort as any resulting award is unenforceable
due to DSU Article 26.1.
In pointing out the obvious normative failures in the Trump Administration's strategy, I am
certainly not suggesting that China always faithfully executes WTO law. Rather, my point
is that the best way, and perhaps the only way, to get China to act more responsibly is to
inculcate international legal norms into China's national trade practices. The Trump
Administration's strategy to use coercion rather than reason to change China's behaviour
may seem pragmatic and realist to Trump's team, but nothing could be more naive than to
imagine that weapons that hurt the United States as much as (or more than) they hurt China
will succeed in enabling the United States to dictate to China what China's economic
policies will be.
As explained above, the US strategy of bilateral bargaining with China in the shadow of US
tariffs suffers the pathology of displacing law with power. Another dimension of the
pathology is the displacement of the multilateral WTO negotiating forum with secretive
US-China bilateral talks. Other than No. 12 above, all of the US complaints about China
reflect systemic issues that affect the WTO membership as a whole. Should China pledge
to reduce state control, the ensuing policies can externalize benefits to all WTO members,
not just the US. But there is also a danger of reaching exclusive US-China arrangements
that would externalize costs on other WTO members.159
4

Conclusion

This study dissects America's top 20 charges against Chinese trade-related misbehaviour.
The study finds that at least half of the charges (Nos. 1-10) violate WTO rules. Of those 10,
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the Trump Administration has brought claims against only three of them (Nos. 6, 7, and
10).
China should be held to the international rule of law, but so should the United States. The
US tariffs being imposed against China under the Sections 201, 232, and 301 schemes
violate international trade law, and this US misbehaviour in the WTO obscures
misbehaviour by China. The US Section 301 tariffs have been imposed in response to five
types of alleged misbehaviour by China (Nos. 1, 6, 10, 18, and 20). The Section 201 and
232 tariffs are not predicated on China's misbehaviour.
Table 1 above reveals notable surprising features of the US trade war against China: Six of
the US claims are for types of behaviour that are not inherently wrongful in a diverse world
economy and that are not a WTO violation (Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 19). Four types
raise policy issues that are more properly considered outside of the WTO and for which
better international cooperation is needed (Nos. 14–17.) Two of the types (Nos. 18, 20)
relate to China's activities within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States for which
the Trump Administration has tightened up domestic regulation and enforcement. Yet, the
Trump Administration is also using Section 301 sanctions against those two types. The use
of Section 301 sanctions for Chinese investment (No. 18) is especially perverse as China
owes no duty to the US until US regulators prescribe what movements of capital and
technology are prohibited.
Two of the claims (Nos. 12 and 18) ascribe to China's government full responsibility for
actions that occur in large part in China's private sector. Seeking to make China's
government accountable for private sector behaviour is consistent with the Trump
Administration's assumptions as to the limited extent of market conditions in China. That
logic is circular, however, because to achieve the changes that the Administration seeks in
at least five claims (Nos. 1, 12, 17, 18, 19), the Chinese government will need to expand its
control of private economic actors.
Seven of the US claims raise systemic issues for which WTO law is said to be inadequate
to govern problems related to large non-market economies (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11). Yet
the Trump Administration has not promoted WTO negotiations for any of these issues.
Instead, the most USTR has done is to co-author a Joint Scoping Paper with the EU and
Japan regarding the need for stronger rules on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises,
the definition of a public body, and the identification of market-oriented conditions.160
If there are to be new international norms to govern the competition between market and
non-market economies, the norms and standards have to be based on competitive neutrality
principles that apply to all countries and economic systems equally. USTR can pontificate
that China "continues to embrace a state-led mercantilist approach to the economy and trade
that is fundamentally incompatible with the open, market-based approach envisioned and
followed by other WTO members.”161 Nevertheless, to many observers, the Trump
Administration's trade policies also look state-led, mercantilist, closed, and non-market
based. This is especially true of the industrial policies for steel, aluminum, and washing
machines, the calculated selection of beneficiaries of Section 301 tariffs, the blocking of
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China's inward investment into the United States, and Trump's recent expansion of BuyAmerican requirements.162
Decrying state capitalism is easy rhetorically, but when governments meet together to write
rules, a granular approach is needed to unpack complex terms such as "state-led,"
"mercantilist," "open," and "market-based." How does an international regulator objectively
determine when those indicated conditions exist? Are government policies to provide public
goods state-led? Should steel "overcapacity" be addressed by market or non-market
approaches? Will market-based policies be sufficient to address market failure? What
strategies needed to control the pathologies of government failure?163 What rules should
guide industrial policies in "open" economies? Should the SCM Agreement be expanded to
cover implicit downstream subsidies? Anyone seeking to devise a code of fair competition
between market and nonmarket economies will need to think through difficult questions
such as these.
The existential challenge facing the OECD countries is not low-cost imports from China,
but rather how to maintain an attractive development model for the rest of the world. The
key advantage for the United States, Europe, and Japan is the jointly-shared embedded
commitment to rule of law, democratic institutions, free markets, effective regulatory
structures, and international cooperation.
The tragedy of the Trump Administration's economic aggression against China is its
willingness to cast those principles aside in order to elicit ad hoc Chinese concessions.
Whether or not the Chinese government agrees to alter some domestic policies, Trump's
narcissistic economic war against China will erode the public's appreciation for the benefits
of rule of law and international cooperation. By contrast, other than China's blunder in
retaliating against the Section 301 tariffs, China has shown itself to be a WTO supporter
that will not cave into US efforts to return the trading system to the law of the jungle.164
China was among the many governments that brought a WTO case against the Section 232
tariffs, and the recent WTO panel report in the Russia - Traffic in Transit case makes a win
by the Section 232 plaintiffs much more likely.165
The Administration's efforts to shut down the Appellate Body may make it impossible for
the United States to prosecute cases against China in the WTO dispute system. This is
puzzling at a time when Trump himself is bragging that because of his policies, "we're doing
better even with WTO. We're winning cases all of a sudden because they know my
attitude."166 Of course, the US cannot win WTO cases against China unless USTR is willing
to do the heavy lifting to prepare and prosecute such cases.
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By holding the Appellate Body hostage, the Trump Administration is apparently seeking to
pressure other WTO members to agree to a change in DSU rules that would increase the
likelihood of Appellate Body rulings against China as defendant and, at the same time,
decrease the likelihood of rulings against the United States as defendant. Failing that firstbest outcome, the revealed preference of USTR seems to be to turn off WTO enforcement
in order to preserve "policy space"167 for the US to impose WTO-illegal Section 301 and
trade remedy tariffs against China. Rather than being viewed as a valuable public good, the
judicial independence of the Appellate Body is despised by the Trump Administration as a
restriction on US sovereignty.168
Although US unilateral power may still be strong enough to humble China, the projection
of US power cannot be the sole basis on which to lead the world. Addressing the global
problems of the 21st century — particularly climate, health, and cyberspace— will require
more intensive intergovernmental cooperation buttressed by an effective international legal
system.169 The Trump Administration's rejection of global governance on trade, climate,
and other important areas of law is a misstep of major consequence. Unlike the state of
play when America rejected the League of Nations a century ago, this time there is a record
of accomplishment by the multilateral system.
For its overall strategy to reform China and provide US global leadership on trade, I give
the Trump Administration a generous grade of "D". The best features are the WTO cases
lodged against Nos. 6, 7, and 10 and the exemplary case studies demonstrating how not to
carry out trade policy. Three of Trump's complaints against China (Nos. 2, 3, and 8) expose
the double standards in US protectionism. Five of the US complaints (Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16,
17) concern complex international problems for which the Administration has offered
neither thoughtful ideas nor political leadership. The rest of Trump's trade strategy suffers
for being poor lawyering (Nos. 1-11), mercantilist (No. 12), WTO-illegal (Nos. 1, 6, 10, 13,
18, and 20), or nonsense (Nos. 13, 19).
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